In philosophy it is syntax, even more than vocabulary, that needs to be corrected .
Introduction
The status of singular terms in natural language is one of the most enduring-not to say tortured-issues in the logico-semantic analysis of natural language. At the risk of appearing to prolong the agony, I would like to propose a semantics of s.t.s in English which retains the virtues of other well-known accounts while avoiding their faults. I claim no special novelty for the raw materials I employ, which have been readily at hand for some time-specifically, free logic and (subject to a bit of tweaking) the general framework for semantic analysis of Keenan and Faltz (1985) , hereinafter referred to as "KF". Combining the two-more precisely, couching the former in the latter-leads to an analysis which successfully accounts for a broad range of linguistic facts while avoiding the philosophical difficulties to which a free logical treatment would otherwise be heir.
A secondary goal, of a more pedagogical nature, is to acquaint a broader audience with KF, which in my opinion deserves more attention that it has thus far received in either the linguistic or the philosophical communities. It should be noted in this regard that Keenan and Faltz (1985) advance an analysis of s.t.s with which I take issue in some crucial respects (see §4.2.5 below); but this is less a challenge to fundamental aspects of their overall theory than an attempt to capitalize on consequences of it that they themselves had not envisaged.
I should say at the outset that I will not take any position here on the controversy between Russell and Strawson over the question of whether or not sentences such as Pegasus flies or The present King of France is bald have truth values. I will analyze these sentences in such a way as to assure only that they satisfy the necessary conditions for falsehood; the analysis is expressly designed to leave open the question of whether they also satisfy any sufficient ones. 1 I should make it clear as well that while I part company with Russell in some important particulars, the points of disagreement have to do with matters of execution rather than with basic desiderata. Thus, I am in full agreement with his position regarding the nature of the philosophical problem posed by the existence of expressions like Pegasus or the present King of France , differing with him only in regard to how the difficulty is to be resolved without resorting to indefensible ontological excesses.
Background assumptions
Since the seminal work of Montague (1974) , research into the formal semantics of natural language has been guided by two basic principles. The first of these is that it is possible, despite the arguments of Frege and Russell to the contrary, to reconcile grammatical and logical form. The second is that the optimal formulation of the semantics for a language is COMPOSITIONAL , meaning that syncategorematicity is eschewed and the semantic value of a composite expression is always treated as a function of the values of its immediate subexpressions and their manner of combination. The analysis to be proposed here is generally consistent with these suppositions; there are some cases in which, for expository convenience, I give less than a fine-grained compositional analysis, though it has been proven that such an analysis always exists (Zadrozny 1994) . 2 In KF, singular terms are a special case of the syntactic category of NOUN PHRASES . Individual names, such as Alice , are LEXICAL instances of the category, that is, instances consisting of a single word; among the nonlexical instances are the DETERMINED noun phrases, that is, phrases of the form αβ where α is a determiner and β a common noun. 3 In keeping with standard practice, nonlexical s.t.s will henceforth be termed (SINGU-LAR) DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS . Attention will be confined to d.d.s of the form the α , though it should be noted that there are d.d.s of other formse.g. Smith's murderer . We may also be casting the net somewhat too widely in that there are expressions of the form the α which are standardly considered to constitute proper names (e.g. The Hague ), and also definite generics, as in The cow is of the bovine ilk , about which we will have more to say later. I'll proceed in the hope that these are but minor potholes in the road to higher truth which can be easily paved over.
Intuitively, it seems clear enough that there is a difference between, for example, Pegasus and Napoleon , there having once been an actual individual to whom the latter could be applied whereas no such individual has ever existed to whom the former could be. Further, it seems equally clear that an analogous relationship holds (in early 1997, at any rate) between, say, the King of France and the Queen of England . I will characterize this difference in a pretheoretical way by calling an expression of the second kind A PROPERLY SINGULAR TERM (a "p.s.t."). One possible way of understanding this notion is to think of a s.t. as a p.s.t. iff there is exactly one existing thing to which a language user may refer by means of a fully consummated act of reference (in the sense of Searle 1969) making essential use of the expression in question. (A formal definition of proper singularity in terms of KF will be given in §5.) As we shall see, there is reason to divide non-p.s.t.s into two categories: those to which a semantic value can be assigned even though a real-world referent is lacking, and those which have no semantic value.
At the level of sentences, care should be taken in distinguishing between two notions which might or might not turn out to be identical. The semantics is so constructed as to assign one of two elements of the set {0, 1} to each sentence whose semantic value is defined; there is nothing, however, to require us to identify these objects with truth values: having a semantic value of 1 is taken here to be potentially only a necessary condition for truth, and having a value of 0 only a necessary condition for falsehood. The account of s.t.s to be advanced below is thus neutral as regards the controversy between Russell (1905 Russell ( , 1919 and Strawson (1950) on the question of whether a sentence like (1) The Pope's wife is Catholic.
is false or lacking in truth value altogether; all that will be assumed here is that such sentences have 0 as their semantic value. (See, however, Neale 1990, pp. 26ff.) However, in keeping with the existence of noun phrases lacking semantic values altogether, there are cases in which a sentence lacks truth value by virtue of having an uninterpreted (i.e., valueless) subexpression. Such cases are taken up in §5.4. By the same token, I assume here a distinction between the notions of DENOTATION and REFERENCE. Specifically, I take the former to be a relation between a linguistic expression and its value as assigned by the formal semantic system, while the latter is alternately a speech act or a relation between a s.t. and the object to which the language user refers in performing the act in question. The door is thus open to allowing s.t.s to denote even when they lack referents. Indeed, this is precisely the situation that I shall argue obtains in regard to s.t.s like Pegasus and the Pope's wife , and I take it to be a major virtue of KF that it allows such an account to be implemented in a natural way.
The problem of non-proper singularity
The extensional semantics of s.t.s would be unproblematical but for the existence of s.t.s which fail of proper singularity. In this section, I briefly review the classical free logical treatment of such terms and the difficulties it confronts; I then consider one possible means of escape, which none the less runs into problems of its own. This then sets the scene for the introduction of KF ( §4) and a demonstration that the shortcomings of both approaches can be avoided by a formulation of free logic within that framework ( §5).
Consider a fragment of ordinary English which includes just the following sentences: A free logical model for this fragment is an ordered triple < D , * , · ‚ >, where D is a nonempty set, * ∈ D and · ‚ is a function associating each s.t. with an element of D , each monadic predicate with an element of pow( D ) and each sentence with an element of {0, 1}, and is defined in such a way that the following conditions are satisfied:
for all subject-predicate sentences with subject α and predicate β , · αβ‚ = 1 iff · α‚ ∈ · β‚ . Assume a particular model in which · ‚ is so defined that:
Then (2a), (2c) and (2e) are assigned the value 1 and (2b) and (2d) the value 0 relative to the model.
These consequences of the analysis seem to be exactly the desired ones, but come at the cost of positing the element * of D , whose ontological status is problematical. For suppose that * exists; then we would expect it to be an element of · exists‚, which by design it is not. If it does not exist, then { * } is empty and (2e) has 0 as its value-counter to the very appearances we are trying to save.
Consider now a resolution of this difficulty along the following lines. Assume that a model for the fragment takes the form of an ordered pair <D, · ‚> where D is a (possibly empty) set and · ‚ is defined in such a way that the following conditions hold (where
1 ; (iv) ·is nonexistent‚ = {Ø}; (v) for all subject-predicate sentences ϕ, ·ϕ‚ is as defined previously. Consider a specific model in which the following further conditions obtain:
·the Pope‚ ∈ D 1 1 ; ·the Pope's wife‚ = Ø; ·is Catholic‚ ⊆ D 1 1 . Exactly the same values are assigned to the examples in (2) as were assigned in the earlier treatment, but the mysterious * has been eliminated; in its place is the empty set, about which there are presumably no comparable ontological doubts. Now, however, a new problem arises. In this analysis, the denotata of s.t.s are elements not of D but of pow(D), leaving us to confront the ontological status of D. The difficulty here is that if the elements of D exist then presumably they can be named; but things have been arranged in such a way that they are prohibited even in principle from serving as the denotata of naming expressions in the language. (There is also an inelegant excrescence, namely the duplication by D 1 1 of D, with which D 1 1 is in a 1:1 correspondence.) If, on the other hand, they do not exist, then ·exists‚ = Ø in all models. But it is essential that ·exists‚ be nonempty in all models in which D is.
These difficulties notwithstanding, there are some real advantages to a free logical treatment of non-proper singularity, particularly as compared to Russell's; though I defer discussion of them to a later part of the paper ( §5.3.), I'll note at this point that one of the reasons for the appeal of KF is that it allows for yet another way of implementing free logic which does not run afoul of the aforementioned obstacles. The next section ( §4) will give a general overview of the system; the section following ( §5) will then consider how to implement a free logical treatment of s.t.s and will deal in more detail with the motivation for it.
Outline of KF

Boolean syntactic categories and generalized entailment
Let α, β be noun phrases and γ, δ monadic predicates. Then α and β γ ⇒ α or β γ α γ and δ ⇒ α γ or δ.
The basis for these entailments can clearly be "localized" in the coordinate noun phrases, the logical relationship between the entire sentences being obviously due to the fact that α and β and α or β stand in an analogous relationship, as do γ and δ and γ or δ-which, in turn, is analogous to the relationship between αγ and βγ and αγ or βγ, resp., αγ and αδ and αγ or αδ. Keenan and Faltz term this relationship GENERALIZED ENTAIL-MENT, a natural formalization of which is a central goal of their proposed framework. A BOOLEAN syntactic category is one whose members include expressions formed by combination with not, and and or; for any such category the associated logical type is so defined as to have the internal structure of a Boolean algebra. There is accordingly a uniform semantics for not, and, and or, which are interpreted as Boolean complement, product and sum respectively 4 and thus have the same interpretation regardless of the category of expressions with which they are combined. 5 Entailment is then easily generalized in the desired way: for arbitrary expressions α, β of some Boolean category, α entails β iff the semantic values of α and of β always sum to the latter. 6 What KF ultimately amounts to is treating the whole range of Boolean categories in the same way mathematically as sentences in classical propositional logic-an extremely powerful but also entirely natural crosscategorial generalization. The only difference between sentences and subsentential expressions involving not, and, and or is that whereas the former are (classically) interpreted in terms of the binary BA {0, 1}, members of other Boolean categories must be interpreted in terms of BAs of other kinds.
The full set of syntactic categories, CAT, is recursively defined as the least set satisfying the following conditions:
(ii) for all X, Y ∈ CAT, ∈ CAT.
The categories S (sentence), NP (noun phrase) and N (common noun) are BASIC and all other categories DERIVED; each derived category consists of expressions which combine with expressions of category Y to form expressions of category X. For example, monadic predicates belong to the category . 7 As in the case of NPs, there are lexical instances of this category (e.g. walk, exist) and nonlexical ones (e.g. walk slowly, love Alice).
To each syntactic category X there corresponds a SEMANTIC TYPE τ(X), this being the set of possible semantic values of the expressions of the category. These may be conceived either extensionally or intensionally, though we confine ourselves for the time being to the extensional case. τ(S) is here taken to consist of the domain of the minimal Boolean algebra <{0, 1},´, •, +, 0, 1>; for all categories , τ( ) is some subset of τ(X) τ (Y) , and the semantic value of an expression consisting of subexpressions α of category and β of category Y is determined by applying the function denoted by the former to the value of the latter. It follows that however τ(NP) is defined (we deal with this matter in the next section, along with the definition of τ(N)), the predicate of a subject-predicate sentence denotes a function f:τ(NP) → {0, 1}, and the semantic value of the sentence as a whole is determined by applying f to the denotation of the subject.
Semantics of nouns, noun phrases and predicates
4.2.1. Model-theoretic preliminaries. Let P (intuitively, the set of properties) be an arbitrary complete, atomic BA taken to constitute the type for monadic predicates and also for common nouns. (See Kac 1992a for defense of a more constrained view, on which P is always finite.) By P + we denote P − {0 P } and by α(P) the set of atoms of P. We provisionally define a model for English as an ordered pair <P, · ‚> where · ‚ satisfies the following conditions:
(i) for all α of the category S, ·α‚ ∈ {0, 1};
(ii) for all α of category N, ·α‚ ∈ P; (iii) for all α of category NP, ·α‚ ∈ pow(P); (iv) for all categories X and Y, and expressions α of category ,
(v) for all categories X and Y, and expressions α consisting of β of category and γ of category Y, ·α‚ = ·β‚(γ).
Clauses (i-iv) amount to definitions of the semantic types corresponding to the categories S, N and NP; clause (v) asserts that the value of every composite expression is determined by functional application. In KF, properties rather than individuals are ontological primitives and individuals are defined as sets of properties. Specifically, an individual (in the special sense of KF) is the greatest set of properties p whose Boolean product is some q ∈ α(P); that is, for each such q (the generator of the individual) the corresponding individual is {p | p ≥ q}, customarily abbreviated to I q . Intuitively, the idea is that each p ∈ I q is the property shared by just those individuals having the atomic terms of p as their generators (from which it further follows that the generator of an individual is unique to that individual). The individuals, clearly, have a rich internal structure one aspect of which will be crucially relevant in the sequel, to wit: for any individual I and property p, p ∈ I iff p′ ∉ I.
It will be noted that in this conception of a model there is no provision for an antecedently stipulated universe of discourse-indeed, KF reverses the usual conception of a model, in which the properties are built up out of an antecedently stipulated set of primitive objects, in favor of one in which individuals are built up out of an antecedently stipulated set of properties. The motivation for doing things this way stems from the desire to avoid exactly the problem which arises in regard to the second of the two formulations in §3 of a free logical model. One could, in principle, stipulate a conventional domain D and then let the elements of D 1 1 generate individuals in the KF sense; but then D would consist entirely of unnameable objects-not to mention being in 1:1 correspondence with the set of individuals and therefore essentially duplicating it. Thus, apart from the
ontological issues, parsimony considerations favour taking properties as primitives.
It will be readily observed that the set of individuals determined P (henceforth i(P)) is in 1:1 correspondence with α(P). At first blush this might seem excessive in that it should suffice to interpret singular proper names as atoms of P rather than as sets of properties. To do so yields incorrect results since the conjunction of any two proper names is interpreted as the Boolean product of the interpretations of the conjuncts, and the product of any two atoms of a ca-BA is 0. This yields, inter alia, the highly undesirable consequence of giving the same interpretation to every conjunction of differently interpreted proper names. If, on the other hand, names denote sets of properties, then the conjunction of two names is interpreted as the set intersection of the two values-which set then consists, as desired, of exactly the properties common to the corresponding entities.
4.2.2. Quantification. We begin by recalling that for all noun phrases α, individual names included, ·α‚ ∈ pow(P). The quantifiers every and some/a are so interpreted that for any common noun α interpreted as p ∈ P,
On the assumption that monadic predicates are of the category , it follows from condition (v) on the definition of · ‚ that all subject-predicate sentences are interpreted by functional application. Such a sentence with subject α and predicate β is true just in case ·β‚ ∈ ·α‚, from which it further follows that each monadic predicate denotation p may be construed as a function from pow(P) into {0, 1} so defined that for all A ∈ pow(P), p(A) = 1 iff p ∈ A, and that each such function is a homomorphism from the domain algebra into the range algebra defined pointwise on the individuals (though not necessarily elsewhere). 8 The algebra P may accordingly be identified with this set of homomorphisms.
One subtlety requiring mention has to do with coordinate noun phrases like every doctor and lawyer. This phrase is ambiguous, denoting on the one hand the set of properties common to all individuals each of whom is both a doctor and a lawyer and, on the other, the set of properties common to all doctors and all lawyers. Since it is not directly relevant to the issues addressed in this paper I won't dwell on the matter here; it is discussed further in the Appendix.
The copula.
The copula is taken to denote the function ε:pow(P) → P so defined that for all A in the domain, ε(A) = ∑{x ∈ α(P) | x ∈ A}. 9 This single interpretation subsumes, inter alia, the various distinct functions shown in the following examples:
Alice is a lawyer
Every prosecutor is a lawyer
Each predicate adjective is taken to denote the union of just the individuals possessing a given property-e.g. if h is the property common to all and only humans then human qua predicate adjective denotes ∪{I ∈ i(P) | h ∈ I}. This parallelism of predicate adjectives with indefinite noun phrases, apart from giving the correct results, can be seen at work overtly in the case of adjectives which may also occur as common nouns: for example in such equivalences as that between Alice is human and Alice is a human.
Negation.
There is a lacuna in the Keenan-Faltz treatment of negative predicates in so far as a sentence like the following is ambiguous as to the relative scope of quantification and negation:
(3) Every lawyer doesn't walk.
10
9 This formulation differs outwardly from the one given by Keenan and Faltz but is equivalent to theirs.
10 Speakers evidently differ as to the ease with which they can get a reading in which the quantifier has narrow scope, some denying that such a reading is even possible. The attention of readers in this category is directed to All that glistens isn't gold.
If a negative predicate whose positive counterpart has interpretation p has p´ as its sole interpretation, then only the interpretation on which the quantifier has wide scope is accounted for. Thus, compare
To account for the other interpretation, we first define a function n from P into {0, 1} p ow ( P ) such that for each p ∈ P and A ∈ pow(P),
Although not directly relevant to this discussion, certain complications in the definition of the logical type for monadic predicates are required by this move. (See Kac 1997 for details.) There is a degree of ad-hoc-ness in the account, in so far as it is necessary to give two distinct interpretations of negative predicates. What is of importance here is that there must be some way of accounting for the scope ambiguity which arises in such cases as this; should a more satisfactory way be found, the consequences will none the less be the same and it is those consequences that are of primary significance in this context.
Definite descriptions.
Formal details aside, Keenan and Faltz take a highly Russellian stance in that their semantics for d.d.s yields exactly the
same results as Russell's (1919, p. 104ff) . For them, ·the‚ = d:P → pow(P) such that for all p ∈ P, which entails that for any common noun α and monadic predicate β, ·the αβ‚ = 0 if ·α‚ is anything other than an atom of P. This leads, inter alia, to the problematical consequence regarding (2e) noted earlier (p. 664 above), about which we will have more to say in the next section. There we will also discuss further difficulties with Russell's theory of s.t.s which accrue equally to Keenan and Faltz's treatment; these can be alleviated in a semantics assuming free logic, and it is in this regard that the KF system, slightly extended, proves especially interesting since it does not run afoul of the same obstacles which interfere with the two approaches discussed in §3.
A Boolean free logical theory of singularity
Preliminaries
We begin with the following slight modification of KF: a model is defined as an ordered triple <P, * , · ‚>, P as defined previously, * ∈ α(P), and · ‚ is so defined that all previously stipulated conditions obtain and ·exists‚ = *´. (Further conditions will be stated later.) We next define the set of PROPER INDIVIDUALS as the set of all and only the individuals not generated by * . All p.s.t.s are interpreted as proper individuals and all non-p.s.t.s as I * . Finally, for each ca-BA B, define
(Where the identity of B is understood from context, the subscript will normally be suppressed.) Accordingly, for each model <P, * , · ‚> we interpret the definite article as δ P . A major virtue of this general approach is that by treating * as a property we avoid entirely the ontological woes of the alternatives discussed in §3-provided, of course, that we are willing to make certain specific assumptions about the nature of properties. But these are part of standard logic in any case, and thus should pose no special difficulty. Even in classical model theory, the properties form a ca-BA by virtue of constituting the domain of a power set algebra, and part of the motivation for having the set of properties take this form is the assumption that for each property
p the nonpossession of p is also a property-represented formally by closure of the set of properties under Boolean complement. Hence, if there is a property common to all existing things, there is a complementary property-the property in question being (in this conception) * . In consequence there is no difficulty with the supposition that * exists; and since properties are the ontological primitives, there is no need to posit a domain of unnameable objects. This, of course, leaves open why the property in question should be an element of P + -let alone atomic-rather than 0 P . In point of fact, the assumption that * is an atom is merely provisional. In the Fregean treatment of singularity sketched in §3, there is a unique element of D taken as the denotatum of non-p.s.t.s, an assumption which, for purely expository reasons, has been carried over into the revised treatment but which will be abandoned later. However, there are both substantive and formal reasons for presuming nonexistence to be atomic (or at least positive), as will be seen in §5.3. Before taking up these questions, I consider the consequences of the analysis for some specific cases.
Examples
Assuming that common nouns like Pope's wife and present King of France are interpreted as * , and that * is an atom, we obtain the results shown in (4) below on the assumption that:
The Pope is Catholic
The Pope is not Catholic
The Pope exists
The Pope's wife exists
The Pope's wife does not exist
The examples (4c)-(4d) and (4g) require some comment. Each has two analyses, as required by the existence of two interpretations for negative predicates, but only one value. The results for (4d) and (4g) are different from those obtained in Russell's theory, on which (4d), for example, should come out true on the construal represented by (i)-that is, the one corresponding to the paraphrase (5) It is not the case that the Pope's wife is Catholic. but false on the one represented by (ii), corresponding to the paraphrase (6) The Pope's wife is a non-Catholic. (on the assumption that for any common noun α, ·non-α‚ = ·α‚´). I maintain, however, that the results in (4) are perfectly defensible, for the reasons outlined below.
Defense of the analysis
I want first to reconsider examples (2b) and (2e) here repeated as (7a) The Pope's wife is Catholic. (7b) The Pope's wife is nonexistent. which are problematical for Russell's theory of descriptions. If the two are taken as exactly parallel, then (7b) is not only false but contradictory (the latter by virtue of asserting, as per Russell, both the existence and the nonexistence of a certain object). On the other hand, (7b), by virtue of its equivalence to (8) The Pope's wife does not exist. might be taken as subject to Russell's analysis of sentences like (8) as ambiguous according as the grammatical subject is taken, logically speaking, to have a primary occurrence (outside the scope of not) or a secondary one (inside the scope of not). If the latter, then (7b) comes out true, as desired, but the question remains of what we are to make of the implicit claim that the sentence has a second interpretation on which it is false. Nor is it clear whether we would have the same latitude in cases like (9a) The Minotaur is a mythical creature.
(9b) The Pope's wife is a figment of your imagination.
where no overt negative element occurs. One might seek to escape this consequence by saying that the predicates of such sentences have implicitly negative content, but it then seems reasonable to ask just how far from the grammatical appearances one should be allowed to stray before recourse to the putative distinction between logical and grammatical form begins to look like a dodge.
Russell meant his theory of s.t.s to serve two purposes: to escape the need to invoke Fregean senses in explaining how it is possible for sentences containing non-p.s.t.s to be meaningful, and to account for such sentences without having to postulate fictitious entities to serve as referents of s.t.s like the Pope's wife. Since the account developed here requires us to do neither of these things, I maintain that we can have our cake and eat it too in so far as we can steer clear of the things Russell wished to avoid while at the same time avoiding the problems just raised.
Consider now why nonexistence is treated as a positive property in models in which card(P) > 2. The rationale can be seen from supposing that nonexistence is 0 P in every such model; if so, then existence is 1 P (as actually assumed by Keenan and Faltz, p. 107) . This has the unfortunate consequence that ·exists or not exists‚ = 1 P + 0 P = 1 P = ·exists‚, whence e.g. Pegasus exists or does not exist ⇔ Pegasus exists. If, on the other hand, exists is interpreted as the property 1 P − *, then this unwanted result is avoided.
The case can be strengthened still further by the consideration of another class of sentences, namely identity statements. Consider, for example, (10) Pegasus is Pegasus.
which is true in the analysis proposed here (assuming that non-p.s.t.s denote I * ) but false on Russell's (see Russell 1919, p. 104) . While I cannot argue that this is a fatal consequence of the latter (Russell, indeed, accepts it with complete equanimity), I think a case can be made for it being at least suspect on other than purely intuitive grounds. Compare a sentence like (10) to one of the same grammatical form but involving a properly singular subject term. Any such sentence would presumably be not only true but tautologous (in the vernacular sense); but whether or not a sentence is tautologous is ostensibly a function solely of its form-whence, if any sentences of the form α is α are tautologous they all are, (10) included.
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There is, of course, a ready answer to this objection, namely that what is at issue here is not the GRAMMATICAL but the LOGICAL form of sentences of the relevant kind, and there is no reason to suppose that, for example, Minneapolis is Minneapolis has the same logical form as (10). However, the hypothesis that the two sentences do not, in fact, have the same logical form quickly leads to further difficulties. First, it entails that statements of the grammatical form α is α, α a s.t., do not all have parallel logical forms. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is in fact the case-specifically, that if a s.t. α is properly singular then α is α is a simple identity statement, but not otherwise. This seems at least unparsimonious, 12 but a more serious problem becomes evident when we consider cases like (11) Czechoslovakia is Czechoslovakia.
Imagine (11) being uttered in 1955. It would be true at the moment of utterance, and would, moreover, be tautologous. But tautologies are necessary truths and necessary truths are, on the usual account anyway, true in all possible worlds and at all possible times. Suppose now that (11) is uttered at the moment of this writing (in January, 1997). We are then forced to say that since Czechoslovakia no longer has a referent, (11) has a different logical form now from what it had in 1955 and accordingly could NOT be a tautology since there is a moment in time at which it's false. Perhaps the difficulty is with the idea of necessary truths as true at all world-time indices, though I suspect that rejection of it will not prove palatable to many.
The alternative remains, of course, of denying tautological status even to Minneapolis is Minneapolis. I doubt, however, that this will prove any more acceptable than the earlier one, and it does not, at any rate, seem to comport with Russell's view of the matter.
13 , 14
11 Actually, we shall see later that this is not quite true since the internal structure of α must also be taken into account. Let it stand for now.
12 I think it safe to say that it is preferable, ceteris paribus, to assume a principle of parity in relating grammatical to logical form, according to which two statements would be alike in the latter to exactly the extent that they are alike in the former.
13 Thus Russell (1919, p. 102) : "'Scott is the author of Waverley' is obviously a different proposition from 'Scott is Scott': the first is a fact of literary history, THE SECOND TRIVIAL TRUISM." [my emphasis.] 14 This in turn points to a difficulty with the analysis proposed by Quine (1948) , on which all s.t.s, including p.s.t.s, are logically construed as d.d.s-at least as long as d.d.s are given a Russellian treatment. Suppose, for example, that Minneapolis is taken to be a truncated form of the city of lakes. Then Minneapolis is Minneapolis could not be a tautology at any world-time index since (on this view) it entails the existence of a city of lakes-a contingent fact if ever there was one.
On balance, then, it seems that there is more to be said for the view that (10) and its fellows are tautologous than there is to be said against it. It is a virtue of the free logical treatment of s.t.s that it entails exactly this result, and a virtue of the KF-based version of the treatment proposed here that it enables us to avoid the difficulties discussed in §3.
If sentences like (10)- (11) are necessary truths, then so presumably are all sentences of the form α is self-identical, α a singular term. If so, and all else is held constant, self-identity does not entail existence. A major virtue of a free logical model (assuming a domain sufficiently large) is that it provides "room" for an interpretation of ·is self-identical‚ which properly subsumes ·exists‚. We will accordingly assume that the class of models is constrained by the condition that ·is self-identical‚ = 1 P . It follows that every statement of the form α is self identical, α a s.t., is true in every model, in keeping with its presumptive equivalence to α is α. It further follows that statements of the form α exists need not be necessary truths since the extension of exist depends on the choice of * and thus varies from model to model. Indeed, it is a characteristic of free logic that a model exists in which there are no true statements of the form α exists, α a s.t., namely the one in which * is the only nonzero element of P.
I return now to the question of whether there need be but one nonproper individual, beginning with the observation that there is no formal reason why we cannot make a further extension to encompass models of the form <P, S, · ‚> where S is a nonempty subset of α(P) and ·exist‚ = [∑S]´, thus creating a free logic with "inner" and "outer" domains (see Thomason 1969) . The specific type of model under consideration to this point is just the special case in which card(S) = 1; allowing S to have any cardinality allows different non-p.s.t.s to be assigned distinct interpretations, thereby making it possible to avoid requiring (as a purely extensional semantics does) that sentences like Pegasus is Medusa or The King of France is the Pope's wife come out true in consequence of the nonproper singularity of the relevant expressions. This in turn means that the properties must be taken as intensional rather than extensional, since if we consider the atomic properties of the various nonexisting things to be distinct we would appear to be committed to the proposition that these properties generate different individuals. However, to make sense of such claims as that Pegasus and The Minotaur are different individuals would appear to commit us to doing something like imagining possible worlds Nor, obviously, can the problem be attributed solely to the choice of the d.d. for which Minneapolis putatively does duty since any such choice will have comparable consequences, the specific properties which distinguish Minneapolis from everything else being contingently possessed. in which they are distinct. I will go on record as wishing that this outcome could be avoided, but I do not see how it can be in the circumstances. I would none the less point out that the introduction of intensionality in this way at least does not change anything in the formal workings of the system. Further motivation for the proposed extension appears in §5.4.
I turn now to a comparison of this approach with a rather different one, namely that of Ojeda (1992) . Without going in detail into the technicalities, I'll point out only that Ojeda's semantics for s.t.s treats non-p.s.t.s as semantically uninterpreted; thus, his interpretation of the definite article is as a function which is undefined on the interpretations of common nouns such as Pope's wife. His reasons stem from the assumption, per Strawson, that sentences like (1) are lacking in truth value-which he implicitly attributes to the absence of a value for the subject term. This leads to a problem not unlike the one confronting Russell in regard to examples like (7), except that now the problem is not that this apparently true sentence is mistakenly characterized as false (or has a spurious alternative interpretation) but that it cannot be assigned a semantic value of any kind. I conclude from this fact that even if there is a presupposition of existence of a referent associated with the subject of a sentence like (1), it cannot be localized in the s.t., but must be accounted for in some way which also takes the predicate into account. I would note as well that the presupposition seems not to hold for s.t.s in non-subject positions. If I say, for example, I had dinner with the Pope's wife yesterday, I could fairly be viewed as having spoken falsely. (See Neale 1990, p. 26ff. for some examples in which this is so even when the d.d. is in subject position.)
Singularity and Uniqueness
On the other hand, there does appear to be some justification for the view that there is a genuine presupposition of UNIQUENESS of the putative referent of s.t.s, and in this regard an interesting property of the free logical account comes to the fore. To set the scene, I begin by considering the consequences of the suggestion of McCawley (1981, sc. 9.6 ) that grammatically singular d.d.s are semantically so only relative to a previously specified contextual domain and not relative to the entire universe of discourse. Thus, a sentence like (12) The computer is down.
is presumed (at a first approximation) to have a truth value only relative to a contextual domain in which the speaker is understood to refer to a single computer. Following a suggestion by Ojeda (1992, p. 63 ) I propose that a common noun α be accordingly viewed not as having a unique value in P but as having a set of possible values related in a certain way. Specifically, pick some arbitrary p ∈ P to serve as the PRIMARY or MAX-IMAL value of α. Further, in the case where p has two or more atomic terms, let each q < p, q ∈ P + , be a SECONDARY value. The intent here is to conceive of the primary value as the property common to the elements of the greatest set of things to which α applies, while each secondary one is the characteristic function of some nonempty proper subset thereof. Then, given a d.d. such as the computer (interpreted nongenerically) the possibility is open of construing computer as denoting an atom of P, in which case δ P is defined on the denotation in question. More precisely, we may say that the interpretation of the (however defined) is a function having α(P) as its domain, and that any common noun whose primary interpretation is a nonatomic element of P + is guaranteed to have one or more secondary interpretations in it.
The above picture must be slightly complicated because of the need to make provision for generic interpretation of d.d.s. Thus, in a sentence like (13) The owl is nocturnal.
I could reasonably be understood either to be attributing the property of being nocturnal to some particular owl whose identity has somehow been established in advance, or to be making a statement about the habits of owls as a species. In the next section I will show how the generic uses of singular d.d.s can be accounted for; I want now to call attention to a further interesting property of the free logical analysis of singularity.
Consider a phrase like the inhabitant of Minneapolis. This may well seem somewhat odd, at least to someone who knows that Minneapolis is a city with several hundred thousand inhabitants. One might, of course, use this phrase in a situation in which it's been established in advance that there is only one such individual in the current contextual domain, or one might be making generic reference; but there is nothing in either our conventional understanding of the constituent expressions or our knowledge of the world to allow us to make sense of this expression except in one of these two ways.
In light of these observations, consider next a phrase like the unicorn. We have here, I contend, a similar oddity at least in so far as there is nothing in our conventional knowledge about the word unicorn to suggest, should there exist anything possessed of the associated property, that there would be exactly one such. (For contrast, consider, say, the Minotaur.) There is something correspondingly odd about (14) The unicorn does not exist. except on a generic construal, that is, as a denial of the existence of unicornkind. The examples below might help make this clearer. Consider what would be the more natural pronoun choice in each of the following: (15a) Since the Minotaur is a mythical creature, it's impossible for you to have seen . (15b) Since the unicorn is a mythical creature, it's impossible for you to have seen . I maintain that it is a perfectly natural choice in (15a), perhaps even preferable, consistent with the presumptive uniqueness of the Minotaur; the same choice in (15b), however, seems decidedly odd, whereas the choice of one seems entirely acceptable-which I take as evidence that a generic construal of the unicorn is called for here. However, I submit that there are cases in which-with the proper context-a nongeneric construal is possible; such a context is provided by (16) I dreamed I saw a unicorn and a manticore. The unicorn was snowy white. The extended free logical treatment of d.d.s is rich enough to accommodate these facts, in so far as it allows a noun like unicorn to be interpreted as a non-atomic positive property, whereas one like Minotaur can perfectly well be interpreted as an atomic one.
Lest some should grow impatient with what might appear to be an orgy of Scholasticism at its worst, let me emphasize that there is an observable phenomenon here to be accounted for: a parallel between the linguistic behavior of d.d.s like the Pope and the Minotaur on the one hand, and that of the unicorn and the inhabitant of Minneapolis on the other. One could imagine a partisan of Russell responding that this is a fact which might perhaps be of interest to linguists but has no bearing on any issue which might arouse the interest of a philosopher with a commitment to sober ontology. Perhaps. I think it interesting none the less that a semantic framework rich enough to accommodate the facts under discussion none the less comports with a sober ontology: while we're claiming that the Minotaur behaves in some ways as if it had a unique referent, no actual referent is being claimed to exist. The fact that nonreferential d.d.s exhibit the behavior they do need not be attributed-as it sometimes is-to the users of ordinary language being led thereby to divorce themselves from reality.
Necessary nonexistence
I turn now to a consideration of expressions like noncircular circle, which pose a special set of problems a full appreciation of which requires that we first fill in some background.
Attributive adjectives fall in a variety of classes, of which only one will be of concern to us here: the INTERSECTIVE adjectives. Characteristic of any such adjective α is that when it combines with a common noun β (to form a larger common noun), ·αβ‚ ≤ ·β‚. In many cases, indeed, the adjective either can also be used as a noun (e.g. human) or is transparently { } it one { } it one derived from one (e.g. circular). Letting p be the property denoted by the associated noun, the corresponding adjective denotes the function f p : P → P such that for each q ∈ P, f p (q) = p • q. Further, for any such adjective α, ·non-α‚ = f p´. It accordingly follows that in any adjective-noun sequence αβ in which ·α‚ = f ·β‚´ ·αβ‚ = 0 P , the phrase noncircular circle being a case in point.
What is of importance here is that while noncircular circle and its fellows have in common with expressions like unicorn and king of France that they denote properties not possessed by any existing thing, there is none the less a crucial difference in that those of the latter type denote elements of P + while those of the former denote the zero property. Further, while we are free to conceive of possible worlds in which unicorn and king of France have different denotations from those they have in the actual world, we have no comparable license with regard to noncircular circle. Both of these facts are consequences of the proposed treatment of intersective adjectives. I take the latter difference to be unproblematical since it is what assures that for example There are no unicorns and There is no king of France are merely contingent truths whereas There are no noncircular circles is necessarily true. The former difference, however, deserves some further comment.
In §5.4. it was pointed out that phrases like the unicorn, on a nongeneric construal, appear odd in much the same way as the inhabitant of Minneapolis. I now submit that the noncircular circle exhibits a similar oddity (nongenerically construed): both violate the presupposition of uniqueness, though in opposite directions-"upwards" in the case of the unicorn (there being nothing in our conventional understanding of the term which compels us to suppose that there would be but one such creature if there were any at all) and "downwards" in the case of the noncircular circle (it being an impossibility for even one such thing to exist). The former kind of violation can be taken in support of the proposed extension of the theory allowing for more than one non-proper individual, while the latter can be taken to support the view that noncircular circle and its fellows denote the zero property.
This analysis has an apparently undesirable consequence, namely that the semantic value of (17) The noncircular circle is the noncircular circle. is undefined (since that of its subject term is undefined), likewise (18) The noncircular circle is noncircular. which would appear to contradict our earlier claim that all sentences of the form α is α are logical truths when α is a s.t. However, this claim was advanced only provisionally, in anticipation of a subtler formulation to whose details we now turn.
The principle that logical truths and falsehoods are true or false in virtue of their form can assume either a strong or a weak guise. In the strong version, the principle says that if any sentence in a given form is a logical truth or falsehood, then so are all sentences in this form. This version presupposes that all sentences do in fact have truth values and is clearly untenable if this presupposition turns out to be incorrect. This would seem to require us to retreat only very slightly, to a mild weakening of the principle according to which if a sentence of a given form is a logical truth or falsehood then so is any other sentence whose truth value is defined. Lest this seem to make life more complicated than it would be otherwise, I would point out that it is perhaps more revealing to say that the preferred interpretation of the principle connecting logical truth with form is the weakest possible one which none the less assures that if a sentence of a given form has semantic value v in all possible worlds, no sentence of this form has a value other than v in any possible world. Such an interpretation is completely neutral as to whether all sentences have truth values, from which it follows that the supposition that they do represents an added complication. On this view, logical truth is but a special case of a more general property, that of LOGICAL VACUITY-that is, failure, by virtue of form, to have contingent consequences.
Consider now a different problem. We alluded above to a similarity in oddness between the unicorn and the noncircular circle (nongenerically construed), which we attributed to a violation of the presupposition of uniqueness. We also noted that the violations are not exactly parallel, the former being "upward" and the latter "downward". The latter eliminates any recourse to secondary values of the sort which helps us explain why the unicorn does not seem odd in the context provided by (16): if a common noun has 0 P as its primary interpretation, then there are no lesser properties which can be taken as potential secondary ones. We would accordingly expect the oddness of the noncircular circle to persist even in a context parallel in essential respects to (16). However, this expectation does not appear to be borne out: for example, (19) I dreamed that I constructed two circles one of which was noncircular. The noncircular circle had a circumference of 1 cm. seems no more odd than (16).
There is a real problem here, but of a kind whose solution would appear to fall out of the solution to another problem which arises irrespective of what assumptions one makes about the semantics of singular terms. To see why, observe first that a sentence of the form (20) I dreamed that ϕ apparently entails that ϕ is true in the world of my dream. Now suppose that ϕ is a contradictory sentence containing no singular terms. Some adjustment of the semantics of the language would seem to be necessary if the entailment is to go through in this case. No matter what the required adjustments involve in particular cases (I take no position on that question), whatever is needed to sanction the relevant entailment of the first sentence of (19) could reasonably be expected to affect the denotations of circle or noncircular in such a way as to then make it possible for the denotation of the noncircular circle to be defined.
Conservativity
I conclude this section with a formal remark on the analysis of the definite article. Keenan and Stavi (1981) argue that the semantic type for determiners does not comprise the whole of pow(P) P , but consists entirely of CONSERVATIVE functions, that is, functions f such that for all p, q ∈ P, p ∈ f(q) iff p • q ∈ f(q). It can easily be shown that δ P , the function interpreting the in the analysis proposed here, has this property. Let q ∈ α(P); then
To show the converse it suffices to observe that every individual is a lattice closed under Boolean product and sum; hence, if p ∈ I q , p • q ∈ I q .
Singularity and genericness
We come finally to consideration of noun phrases of the form the α with generic force, as in (13), here repeated as (21) The owl is nocturnal.
In this section I shall show how a straightforward elaboration of the notion "property" (leading to a corresponding one of the notion "individual") enables us to assimilate generic to nongeneric d.d.s. 15 The proposed theory of s.t.s thus extends into an even broader domain, thereby acquiring a correspondingly higher degree of plausibility.
There are three ways in principle of accounting for the generic use of singular d.d.s. The first is to assume that the definite article has some special kind of interpretation mathematically distinct from the one associated with its nongeneric use; the second is to assume that the definite article has the same interpretation in both generic and nongeneric d.d.s, from which it follows that common nouns have interpretations in two different algebras: P (henceforth, the set of NONGENERIC properties) and a second ca-BA (the set of GENERIC properties). The third is to assume that BOTH common nouns and the definite article have special interpretations in the generic case.
16 I shall show below that it's possible to implement the second strategy, and will then give arguments for its being the optimal one, ceteris paribus. Part of the argument can be made immediately since it consists of a simple appeal to parsimony: of the three, the third should be adopted only if there is no other choice. Since there is a way to handle generics via the second (as I show below), the issue then comes down to whether this approach is preferable to the first. I will argue later that it is.
The exposition will be greatly facilitated by two interrelated observations about generic statements like (21). The first of these is that such statements, initial appearances to the contrary, are NOT equivalent to universal quantifications over "ordinary" individuals. The following examples illustrate:
(22a) The computer is a useful tool.
(22b) The novel is a diverse genre.
A statement like (22a), at least on a generic construal, is not falsified by the existence of any particular computer which, for whatever reason, fails to be useful: hence, (22a) does not entail Every computer is a useful tool. The case of (22b) is even stronger, since replacement of the by every fails even to yield a well-formed sentence.
The second observation is that while there are many predicates and common nouns which admit of both generic and nongeneric interpretations, there are some which admit only of the former. The predicate of (22b) is a case in point; so, I submit, are common noun sobriquets like king of beasts or ship of the desert. So, for example, The lion is the king of beasts is not about any particular lion but rather about lionkind.
I want now to advance a specific proposal about the treatment of genericness, namely that for any set P of nongeneric properties, pow(P) is the corresponding set of generic properties. Before considering the precise formal mechanics of the associated treatment of generics and the overall motivation for this claim, let me put it in slightly different form: every generic property is a set of nongeneric properties, and conversely. As we shall see, these two hypotheses taken together provide a simple and general way of assuring that the set of generic properties will have the characteristics required to account for a variety of facts about the behavior of generic expressions.
We accordingly redefine a model as an ordered quadruple <P, S, · ‚ 0 , · ‚ 1 > where P and S are defined as before, · ‚ 0 is · ‚ as previously defined and · ‚ 1 is just like · ‚ 0 except in being subject to the following conditions:
(i) The range of the function is pow(P) rather than P.
(ii) 0 P ∉ ·exists‚ 1 .
(iii) For all α, β ∈ N ∪ , if ·α‚ 0 and ·β‚ 0 are both defined and ·α‚ 0 ≤ · ‚ 0 then ·α‚ 0 ∈ ·β‚ 1 , except as provided for in (ii) above.
(iv) Let α be a common noun. In the case where ·α‚ 0 is defined,
The precise motivation for conditions (ii-iv) will become apparent as the discussion proceeds, but one explanatory comment can be made immediately about them. The reason · ‚ 1 cannot be an arbitrary function into pow(P) is that when a common noun or monadic predicate has both generic and nongeneric values, the former is clearly at least partly determined by the latter. (As we shall see, the determination is not total in all cases.) For example, The lion is the king of beasts is about lions, not about tigers, dinosaurs or Abelian groups, and Every lion is a feline entails The lion is a feline. Such facts as these are among the consequences of the above conditions.
We turn now to the evidence for this conception of generic properties. First, since pow(P) is a ca-BA, it is possible in principle to treat generic properties in a way which exactly parallels nongeneric ones. That there is such a parallelism can be seen from several considerations. Let's begin by considering generic d.d.s, as in (21) above. In accordance with condition (iv) on the definition of · ‚ 1 , on the assumption that ·owl‚ 0 = o, ·owl‚ 1 is the set of all positive nongeneric properties subsumed by o and δ pow(P) is undefined on this denotation if it is nonatomic; however, we can obtain secondary denotations in exactly the same way we did before. Suppose that we pick {o}. Then the owl, generically construed, has I {o} as one of its values and (21) comes out true just in case {o} ⊆ ·is nocturnal‚ 1 . However, since the converse of (iv) is not assumed, it need not be the case that o ≤ ·is nocturnal‚ 0 and there is accordingly no entailment that every particular owl has nocturnal habits.
In keeping with the foregoing, we reconstruct the intuitive notion of a KIND as a singleton element of pow(P). Further, for each p, q ∈ P, {p} is a SUBKIND of {q} iff q ≤ p. Observe now that, per (iv), each generic common noun interpretation A has a greatest element and that this element, denoted by Γ(A), is unique. Let's call {Γ(A)} the MAXIMAL kind with respect to A. All of the secondary interpretations of a noun interpreted as
A are subkinds of {Γ(A)} by the above definition. This in turn comports with the fact that definite generics may, like common nouns, be construed "broadly" or "narrowly" in different circumstances, with the broadest possible construal being the default case. Thus, compare:
(23a) The train is the most flexible of all transportation modes in its ability to expand capacity to meet demand. (23b) On the rail route between Paris and London, the train passes through a tunnel built under the English Channel. (23a), generically construed, is clearly intended to tell us something about the characteristics of trains in general; (23b), by contrast, tells us only about those trains which ply the rail route between Paris and London, but still has generic force. Formally, if we take t to be the property of trainhood and c to be the sum of the atomic properties of the trains running on the Paris-London route through the Channel Tunnel (whence c ≤ t), then train would have the secondary senses {t} and {c} in (23a)-(23b) respectively; the train accordingly denotes I {t} in (8a) and I {c} in (23b). Examples of this sort can easily be multiplied in many directions; in so far as this is so, we have additional support for the hypothesis that generic properties are sets and that at least some of these sets have the type of internal structure imputed to them by condition (iv) on the definition of · ‚ 1 .
Although the α on its generic construal does not entail every α, the converse entailment holds: for example, Every lion is a feline (nongeneric) entails The lion is a feline (generic). This result is assured by conditions (iii) and (iv) acting in concert. Let l and f be the denotations of lion respectively feline, and assume that l ≤ f. Then Every lion is a feline is true. By (iv) ·lion‚ 1 ⊆ {p ≤ P + | p ≤ l} and the lion on its broadest generic construal accordingly denotes I {l} . By (iii), {l} ⊆ ·is a feline‚ 1 , assuring that the generic sentence comes out true.
The foregoing in turn leads us to consider generically interpreted NPs other than d.d.s. Consider (24a) Every mammal is a vertebrate. (24b) The mammal is a vertebrate. (24c) Every mammal suckles its young. (24d) The mammal suckles its young. We can construe (24a) in either of two ways: as attributing vertebratehood to each particular mammal, or as asserting of every mammalian SPECIES that its members are vertebrates. As it happens, the sentence is true on both construals, and on each construal entails (24b) (similarly construed). Now consider (24c). Nongenerically construed (and also on some generic construals), this statement is false since all male mammals are counterex-amples. However, on its broadest generic construal, that is, taken as a statement about mammalian species considered as wholes, it is true. Further, the sentence on its generic construal entails (24d) on its generic construal. The first of these facts is accounted for by our not having imposed the converse of (iii) as a condition on · ‚ 1 . Thus, even though m is not a term of the nongeneric denotation of the predicate in (24c)-(24d), we are free if we wish to include it in the generic denotation. If determiners are interpreted the same way in generic NPs as they are in nongeneric ones, ·every mammal‚ 1 = ∩ {I ∈ i(pow(P)) | {m} ∈ I} = I {m} . It is then clear why (24d) also comes out true on its broadest generic construal (though not necessarily on any narrower one).
We are now in a position to see why it is preferable to hold determiner denotations constant across nongeneric vs. generic interpretations, treating generic properties as constituting a ca-BA just as nongeneric ones do-namely that all of the following have generic interpretations: (25a) Every dinosaur is extinct.
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(25b) At least one mammal is aquatic. (25c) No marsupial exceeds the kangaroo in size. Thus, (25a) can be understood as saying that no dinosaur species survives, (25b) that there is a mammalian species with water as its natural habitat, and (25c) that the largest marsupial species is the kangaroo. The quantifiers, however, appear to retain their familiar senses even on generic readings of these sentences, so the most plausible conclusion to draw is that it is the associated nouns-and only these-which have generic senses different from their nongeneric ones.
If the foregoing justifies (in the context of the overall theory) the conclusion that there are both generic and nongeneric properties and that the former constitute a ca-BA just as the latter do, it does not of itself support the view that for any set P of nongeneric properties the corresponding set of generic properties is pow(P). The issue can be broken down into two subsidiary questions: why assume that generic properties are sets of nongeneric ones, and why assume that any set of nongeneric properties can be a generic one? I take each of these up in its turn.
Part of the answer to the first question is implicit in the solution to the "breadth of coverage" problem discussed in connection with (23). Against that background, consider the need to reconcile two seemingly incompatible requirements. On the one hand, generic s.t.s parallel their nongeneric counterparts in that they can take the form either of d.d.s (the lion) or proper names (Felis leo). This suggests that the notion of individuality is just as relevant at the generic level as at the nongeneric one, which in turn means that generically construed nouns must denote atoms of a ca-BA-in terms of which we then formally reconstruct the intuitive notion of a kind. On the other hand, kinds have subkinds: for example, the entire kind consisting of trains has as one of its subkinds the one consisting of just those which operate on the rail route between Paris and London. The natural expectation would be that if some kind k 1 is a subkind of k 2 and kinds are elements of the domain of a BA, then k 1 ≤ k 2 -but this relation never holds among atoms. However, the relation can hold between the elements of two atoms (singleton subsets of P), and the cases in which it does hold between elements of singleton sets of nongeneric properties are exactly the ones in which we would say that one of the sets in question is a subkind of the other. The presumption that generic properties are sets accordingly gives us a way of treating kinds as atoms while at the same time imparting to them the modest degree of internal structure required to enable us to formalize the subkind relationship in the desired way.
So much for the contention that generic properties are sets of nongeneric ones; what about the converse claim? In this connection I would first call attention to the fact that generically construed predicates are subject to disjunction, as in:
(26) The komodo dragon is a reptile or suckles its young.
We could, of course, suppose that the interpretation of the predicate of (26) is determined in two steps: assignment of a nongeneric value and assignment of the corresponding generic value in a way parallel to the one described in condition (iii). This will give correct results for (26), which is true on both nongeneric and generic construals. However, it will not work for a case like the following: (27) Every feline is a reptile or suckles its young.
The reason is that this sentence is false when nongenerically construed, but-for reasons discussed earlier-has a generic construal on which it's true. To account for this fact, we evaluate the predicate by first assigning a generic value to each of the disjuncts separately and then taking the sum (union) of the results. The obvious way to make provision for cases such as these is to presume the set of generic properties to be closed under Boolean sum. Since every set of nongeneric properties is a union of singleton sets of such properties, it follows that all such sets are generic properties. 18 18 It should be clear now why the generic properties cannot be a subset of P.
It further follows from this treatment that, for example, The unicorn does not exist is true on a generic construal if it's assumed that u = ·uni-corn‚ 0 ≤ ∑S:
The unicorn does not exist I {u} {p ∈ P | p ≤ ∑S} ______________________________ 1 (since {u} ⊆ {p ∈ P | p ≤ ∑S}).
Next, consider why · ‚ 1 is sensitive to whether · ‚ 0 yields a Boolean term of ·exists‚ 0 when applied to a common noun or monadic predicate. The reason has to do with necessary nonexistence. In our earlier discussion of phrases like the noncircular circle, we treated these as semantically undefined at the level of nongeneric interpretations. That move notwithstanding, the noncircular circle surely has a GENERIC interpretation-indeed, we would want things to work out so that The noncircular circle exists is to be false when taken generically. Given our approach to generic interpretations, both of these outcomes are assured. The noncircular circle is interpreted as I {0 P } and, according to the definition of · ‚ 1 , ·exists‚ 1 has only positive members of P as elements. To maintain maximum parallelism with the treatment of nongeneric interpretations, ·does not exist‚ 1 must be ·exists‚ 1´-hence the framing of the definition so as to place 0 P in the latter.
One interesting 19 consequence of this approach has to do with models in which a noun like horse is allowed to be interpreted in such a way that Pegasus is a horse comes out true. If we admit the possibility that some horses exist and some don't then The horse does not exist has an interpretation on which it's true but cannot be taken as a denial of the existence of any horses whatsoever. I leave open the question of whether this amounts to a new insight into the meaning of generic statements or indicates the need for a tightening of the definition of a model so as to exclude the move which leads to it.
Needless to say, all sentences of the form The α is self-identical come out true on their generic construals since (generic) self-identity is 1 pow(p) = pow(P); by the same token, non-self-identity is 0 pow(p) = Ø.
What is a property?
In this (penultimate) section I take up some questions pertaining to the nature of properties in general, most significant among them being: why should the set of properties constitute a ca-BA? 20 The matter is extensively discussed by Keenan and Faltz (1985, p. 73ff.) , who show that the algebraic structure of a ca-BA is exactly what is required to make possible a formalization of the generalized entailment relation adumbrated at the beginning of §4 above. It may be worthwhile, however, to step back a bit from the technical minutiae and try to put the issue in a broader philosophical perspective.
Let me begin with the observation that any theory has, as a matter of necessity, some undefined terms. To this I would then only add that the key notions "property" and "individual" are fundamental enough, in both semantics and ontology, to occasion doubt as to whether they can be defined in terms of anything simpler. On the other hand, this does not preclude an inquiry into whether a given FORMAL RECONSTRUCTION of these notions is in accord with our intuitive sense of them, to the extent that such a sense exists in the first place. In the case of properties and individuals, we have the good fortune to be blessed with quite a rich intuitive base from which to launch the formal enterprise. It is with the relation between the two that I shall be concerned here.
Perhaps the most fundamental intuition regarding properties and individuals (more properly, their connection with each other) is what I shall call the Principle of Complete Interdetermination, to wit: each individual is completely determined by the properties it possesses, and each property is completely determined by the individuals possessing it. In classical model theory, this intuition is encoded in set-theoretic terms: informal statements of the form "Individual I has property p" are re-cast as statements of the form "I ∈ p", where I is an element of the domain of the model and p is some subset of the domain. The complete determination of properties by the individuals possessing them amounts just to the definition of set equality as identity of membership, while the complete determination of individuals by properties stems from the fact that for any individuals I and J, I = J iff there is no subset of the domain which has one but not the other as an element. In KF, the situation reverses but the end result is the same: two individuals are identical iff they are set-theoretically equal (have the same properties) and two properties are identical iff they are elements of the same individuals. 20 Stephen Donaho has pointed out to me that on one level there is no reason to look beyond the question of whether this supposition enables us to solve logicosemantic problems that could not be solved without it. It is also worth pointing out that to so conceive of the set of properties is uncontroversial in so far as it is implicit in the classical model-theoretic view of properties, where these are taken to form the power set of the domain of the model. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that one loses nothing, mathematically speaking, by substituting for the more familiar model-theoretic one the conception of the relationship between properties and individuals found in KF.
Let us now consider some further intuitions about properties, to wit: (i) If being/doing X is a property then so is not being/doing X.
(ii) If being/doing X is a property and so is being/doing Y then so is being/doing Y or being/doing X. (iii) There are instances of X such that no individual is or does X. (iv) There are instances of X such that every individual is or does X. These four correspond in turn to central properties of a Boolean structure: closure under Boolean complement (i); closure under Boolean sum (ii); the existence of a zero element (iii); and the existence of a unit element (iv). We can push these observations even further by noting the following. As regards (iii), Complete Interdetermination entails that the zero element is unique. As regards (iv), the existence of a unit element may be viewed as a consequence of (i) and (iii). Finally, (ii) is but a special case of a broader generalization, to wit: for any set of properties A, possession of at least one element of A is a property. Hence the algebra of properties is complete.
We must, of course, go somewhat further in justifying the claim that the algebra of properties has a Boolean structure. Specifically, we must show that for each postulate in the definition of this type of algebra we can point to a corresponding intuition regarding the nature of properties. I do so below.
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(v) For all x in the domain of a BA, x + x´ = 1.
Intuition: every individual either is/does X or is not/does not do X. (vi) The sum operation is commutative.
Intuition: to be/do X or to be/do Y is the same as to be/do Y or to be/do X. (vii) For all x, y and z in the domain of a BA, x + (y´+ z´)´ = ((x + y)´ + (x + z)´)´. Intuition: to do/be X or to neither fail to do/be Y nor fail to do/be Z is the same as to neither fail to do/be X or Y nor fail to do/be X or Z. It remains, then, to justify atomicity. We begin with the observation that properties can be partially ordered according to how many individuals possess them. If we also grant that for each individual there is a property which that individual alone possesses, then each such property corresponds to a least non-zero element of a BA-that is, an atom. Now let I p be the least set of individuals all of which possess property p, and let A(I p ) be the set of all and only the atomic properties of the elements of I p . Then to be in I p entails having an atomic property in A(I p ) and conversely. This in turn is formally captured by equating p with ∑A(I p ).
Concluding remarks
The perspective from which this paper was written is that of a philosophically inclined linguist with an interest in rigorous analysis of the structure of natural language in both its syntactic and semantic aspects, and skeptical of the belief that natural languages are inherently resistant to such analysis-though even if they should turn out to be in some respects, that does not automatically invalidate seeking out those features which do lend themselves to a formal treatment that gives some insight into their character.
Whereas the seminal works of the modern period of the philosophy of language reflect a mistrust of (indeed, in Russell's case, something bordering on contempt for) natural language as a vehicle for rational discourse, semantic studies in the post-Montagovian era have made this view less plausible than it used to be-though many open questions regarding specifics remain. In regard to s.t.s in particular, there has been a tendency-if hardly a universal one-to retain the semantic substance of Russell's treatment of s.t.s while formalizing it in a way which does not require driving a wedge between grammatical and logical form (Montague's and Keenan and Faltz's treatments being cases in point). This in itself is of more than routine interest given the implicit suggestion in Russell's exposition that such a reconciliation is not possible. Others-e.g. Ojeda (1992) -have opted for a view more like Strawson's. These are not the only possibilities, though: it must be borne in mind that something like Frege's account is also a possible candidate. I've tried to argue here, in fact, that with appropriate modifications, it is the best one.
The sort of analysis undertaken here clearly involves a two-way interaction between linguistics and logic of a sort which has led to some very interesting results but which none the less seem to be known only to a relatively narrow cadre of specialists and seem not as yet to have acquired widespread currency in the philosophical mainstream. In the work which can be fairly credited with having brought this interaction into being in a (28) Alice consulted and Bob sued every doctor. Taking (28) to be equivalent to Alice consulted every doctor and Bob sued every doctor we have the configuration diagrammed below:
Alice consulted and Bob suedevery doctor X 1 Y _____________ X 2 Here X 1 and X 2 are the two separated parts of the discontinuously manifested sentence Alice consulted … every doctor while Y represents the continuously manifested sentence Bob sued every doctor. Implicit in this analysis is the claim that it is possible for the elements of a coordinate structure to be deployed in such a way that the connective stands between a continuously manifested expression of a given type and a discontinuously manifested one of the same type whose right or left edge is also the right or left edge of the continuously manifested expression. A comparable situation can then be viewed as obtaining in every doctor and lawyer, as shown in the following diagram: every doctor and lawyer X Y 2 ____________ Y 1 On this analysis, and is taken as coordinating the continuously manifested noun phrase every doctor with the discontinuously manifested one every lawyer. Since τ(NP) ⊆ pow(P), and denotes set intersection and the interpretation of the phrase on this construal is the same as that of every doctor and every lawyer.
Note Added in Proof
It has been pointed out to me by William Hanson that the adoption of the intensional view of properties has the problematical consequence that e.g. Cicero is Tully is false at all indices since the property of bearing a given name is distinct from that of bearing a different name. One way to circumvent this difficulty short of taking names to be rigid designators is to extend the notion of an intensional model as follows. For each index there is a relation ≈ in α(P) defined as an arbitrary superset of {<p,p> | p ∈ α(P)} (call this relation LOCAL IDENTITY). The copula is then taken to denote a function which, when applied to a given subset A of P, yields ∑{p ∈ α(P) | (∃q ∈ α(A))q ≈ p}. It follows that for all names α and β, α is β has value 1 at any index at which the individuals denoted by α and β have locally identical generators.
